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1 Introduction 
While providing foreign aid to the less advanced economies, donor countries rarely give 
it away in the form of a free transfer of income. Instead, conditions are often imposed, 
specifying the terms on which the funds are provided by the donor to the recipient. This 
widespread practice of tying aid has stimulated a large volume of research on the 
welfare implications of transfers that are conditional on some action or policy change 
being implemented by the recipient.1 
Throughout the theoretical literature on tied aid, the focus of analysis is on the terms-of-
trade and welfare consequences of the transfer. Particular attention is typically devoted 
to the question of the transfer paradox. By contrast, the issue of how various forms of 
aid affect welfare has received much less attention within the usual trade-theoretic 
framework of analysis. Different forms of aid do have different consequences. Any 
given amount of aid will thus have different implications for the welfare of both the 
donor and the recipient, depending on how it is utilized. This raises a number of 
interesting questions. If both the donor and the recipient seek to maximize own welfare 
for any given amount of aid, are they likely to agree or disagree on the pattern of aid 
allocation between the competing needs of the recipient? Under what conditions are 
they likely to agree? 
The analysis of this problem is conducted in the context of a simple two-country, two-
period model of trade and aid. Aid is provided by the donor only in the first period. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that the choice is between funding immediate consumption 
needs of the recipient country or contributing to its long-term development. A fraction 
of this temporary aid package is thus earmarked for unrestricted consumption, while the 
rest is to be invested in infrastructure that serves to increase the efficiency of the 
recipient=s productive factors in period two.  
There are two distortions that play a crucial role in the analysis below. First, the poor, 
recipient country has a suboptimal stock of infrastructure and second, it is unable to 
borrow in the international capital market. In this environment, it is found that both 
countries will never agree to reallocate aid to current consumption at the expense of 
infrastructure development. If one finds it in its interest to do so, the other will not. 
They may, however, under certain conditions, find themselves in agreement to allocate 
more of the aid budget to infrastructure at the expense of period-one consumption. 
When they do agree, it is found that the weight of the first distortion must exceed that of 
the second. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 examines the terms-of-trade and welfare implications of the aid transfer from 
the perspective of both the donor and the recipient. The implications of altering the 
                                                 
1
   Tied aid, whereby the recipient is required to spend a certain proportion of aid on a specific product or 
service, typically an export good of the donor, or expand local production of a particular commodity, 
has been analysed originally by Brecher and Bhagwati (1982), Kemp and Kojima (1985) and 
Schweinberger (1990). Useful surveys are provided by Kemp (1992) and Brakman and van Marrewijk 
(1998). See also Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (1997) and Lahiri et al. (2002) for an analysis of aid 
linked to commercial policy changes.   2
composition of any given amount of aid between the two options are examined in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.  
2 The  model 
Let us consider a two-period model in which two countries exchange two goods in each 
period, but there is no international lending, borrowing, or trade in factor services. The 
absence of international lending and borrowing may be taken to reflect a situation in 
which the recipient country is in a debt crisis, unable to borrow from the market. It is 
assumed that aid is transferred only in period one from the foreign (donor) country to 
the home (recipient) country.2 A fraction x of the transfer, T, is made available to the 
home country for immediate, unrestricted, period-one consumption. The remaining 
fraction 1–x is earmarked for developing the home country’s infrastructure. 
Conditionality of this type is often justified by donor countries on the grounds that the 
aid package should not only serves to meet the recipient’s immediate consumption 
needs (covered by the portion of aid which is released for current consumption), but 
also help address the recipient's long-term development problems by requiring it to use 
the remaining portion of aid for public projects which expand the economy's production 
possibilities. 
In order to obtain a unit of infrastructure, which is operational in period two, it is 
necessary to use up one unit of the numeraire good in period one. For simplicity, let us 
assume that this transformation is costless and therefore does not absorb any of the 
productive factors of the recipient country. Accordingly, with (1–x)T units of the 
numeraire expended on the project in the first period, the home country obtains (1–x)T 
additional units of infrastructure in the second period. Moreover, let us assume that the 
recipient country depends on foreign aid for infrastructure development or faces other 
constraints that prevent it from attaining the optimal stock of infrastructure.3 
Having sketched the framework in which the aid transaction occurs, let us turn to a 
more formal description of both economies. We use capital letters for first-period 
variables, lower case letters for second-period variables and an asterisk to indicate the 
variables of the foreign country. The budget constraints and the equilibrium condition 
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    For the analysis of temporary transfers in intertemporal models of trade, see Djajic, Lahiri, and 
Raimondos-Moller (1998, 1999, 2004). 
3
    This model is closely related to the literature on foreign aid in economies with public goods 
production. Hatzipanayotou and Michael (1995) offer an analysis of an aid transfer in a model with 
public consumption goods. They examine how a transfer absorbs recipient=s productive factors in the 
process of transforming aid into public goods (affecting the supply of private goods) and how it affects 
expenditure on private goods, to determine the terms-of-trade and welfare implications of the transfer. 
In another paper, Michael and Hatzipanayotou (1996) examine the implications of a transfer that 
finances the production of a public input that is used in the production of two internationally traded 
private goods. I assume, instead, that installation of infrastructure in period one absorbs only the 
export good of the donor and not any of the productive factors of the recipient. Moreover, the analysis 
here is conducted in the context of an intertemporal model, where infrastructure absorbs resources in 
period one and expands the availability of consumption goods in period two in a world economy 
where international capital markets are distorted. This intertemporal distortion also distinguishes the 
present model from the one analysed by Schweinberger (2002), where the transfer is in the form of a 
capital good required for the production of a public consumption good in a tariff-ridden economy that 
also produced nontraded goods. See also Kemp and Abe (1994).   3
pertaining to the first period are described below using standard expenditure (E) and 
revenue (R) functions, where the relative price of the non-numeraire good (P) and the 
domestic and foreign utility levels (U and U*) enter as arguments: 
E(1,P,U) = R(1,P) + xT  (1) 
E*(1,P,U*) = R*(1,P) - T  (2) 
EP(1,P,U) + EP*(1,P,U*) = RP(1,P) + RP*(1,P) (3) 
Equation (1) is the budget constraints for the home country, reflecting the fact that a part 
of the transfer (namely xT units of the numeraire good) is distributed to the consumers 
in the form of a lump-sum subsidy. Similarly, equation (2) represents the budget 
constraint of the foreign country where the entire transfer of T units is financed by 
means of a lump-sum tax on foreign households. Equation (3) is the market-clearing 
condition for the non-numeraire good in period one.4 It states that the total world supply 
of that commodity must equal total world demand, which is the sum of the consumption 
demand at home and abroad. The market-clearing condition for the numeraire good is 
omitted due to Walras= Law. 
In the second period there are no transfers and the two countries only exchange goods 
with each other. However, as the units of infrastructure installed in period one bear fruit 
in the second period, they help expand the home country=s production possibilities. The 
infrastructure is made available to the private sector free of charge and is assumed to 
increase the efficiency of the country=s productive factors. Thus, the equilibrium 
conditions for the second period can be written as follows: 
e(1,p,u) = r(1,p,g), where rg > 0, rgg < 0, and rpg > < 0  (4) 
e*(1,p,u*) = r*(1,p)  (5) 
ep(1,p,u) + ep*(1,p,u*) = rp(1,p,g) + rp*(1,p) (6) 
where the stock of infrastructure, g, of the recipient country in period two reflects the 
increase in the supply due to foreign aid. Aid is assumed not to be fungible,5 so that  
dg = (1–x)dT. 
The level of welfare of each economy is defined as a function of period-one and period-
two utilities:  
W(U,u) = U + (1+δ)
-1u (7) 
W*(U*,u*) = U* + (1+δ*)
-1u* (8) 
                                                 
4
    Partial derivative of the revenue (expenditure) function with respect to price gives the supply 
(compensated demand) function for the good. 
5
   Alternatively, if a fraction (1–h) of infrastructure aid is diverted for other purposes, we would have  
dg = h(1–x)dT. We choose not to complicate the model in this manner. On the issue of fungibility of 
aid, see Nurkse (1967), Papanek (1974), Pack and Pack (1990, 1993), Gang and Khan (1991), Khan 
and Hoshino (1992), Khilji and Zampelli (1991, 1994), Feyzioglou et al. (1998), McGillivray (2000), 
and Mavrotas (2005).   4
where δ and δ* are the (constant) rates of time preference at home and abroad. In 
general, δ … δ*. 
3  Welfare implications of aid  
Equations (1) through (8) may be solved for the eight endogenous variables: W, W*, U, 
U*, u, u*, P, and p, as functions of the aid-policy variables T and x. Thus, on the basis 







where Z = EPP+EPP*–RPP–RPP*< 0, is the slope of the compensated demand curve for 
the non-numeraire commodity, C = EPU/EU and C* = EPU*/EU* are the marginal 
propensities to consume the non-numeraire at home and abroad, M* = –M is the 
quantity of foreign imports (equal to home-country exports) of the non-numeraire 
commodity, and S = Z–M*(C*–C). On the assumption that our model exhibits 
Walrasian stability, S < 0. We shall also assume that M* > 0, so that the donor exports 
the numeraire good which is required for building infrastructure.  
The terms of trade of the recipient thus improve in the first period (i.e., dP/dT>0) only if 
xC > C*. With x < 1, this condition is more stringent than the usual condition, C > C*, 
that we find in models where all aid is used for immediate consumption. Tying a 
fraction (1–x) of the aid transfer to development of infrastructure, which under our 
assumptions absorbs an equal number of units of the donor=s export good, makes it more 
likely that the donor=s terms of trade improve in the first period, reducing the burden of 
the transfer. In the extreme case of x = 0, the terms of trade of the donor necessarily 
improve, while period-one welfare of the recipient, as shown in equation (10), 
unambiguously declines. 
In general, the impact of a $1 transfer on period-one welfare of the recipient consists of 
two components: (1) xZ/S > 0, which is the standard welfare gain from getting a 
fraction x of $1 for unrestricted consumption, and (2) (1–x)M*C*/S, which corresponds 
to the negative terms-or-trade effect related to the decline in the foreign demand for 
home exports as foreign spending falls by a fraction (1–x) of $1 which is used to finance 
infrastructure development in the recipient country. 
The effect on donor=s welfare, shown in equation (11), also has two components: (1) the 
standard welfare decline, -Z/S, associated with a $1 transfer and (2) the gain   
–(1–x)M*C/S associated with the terms-of-trade improvement that stems from the 
requirement that the recipient country spends the fraction (1–x) of the transfer on 
infrastructure development (i.e., the donor=s exports), rather than spending (1–x)C of it 
on its own export good. By combining (10) and (11), we note that world welfare in 
period one declines precisely by the amount (1–x)dT, which is allocated to 
infrastructure development. The benefits of this investment are realized by the world 
economy only in period two.   5
The results presented in (9)–(11) are therefore identical to those obtained by Kemp and 
Wong (1993), who examine the implications of a transfer, a portion x of which is 
distributed to the households of the recipient country and the remaining amount (1–x)T 
is lost (in the form of the donor=s exportable good) due to waste. In the present setting 
there is no waste. Instead, the amount (1–x)T is used to increase the recipient's 
production possibilities in period two. The implications of that for the terms of trade and 
the levels of welfare of both economies in period two can be seen by solving equations 







where s  =  z–m*(c*–c)  <  0 by the assumption of Walrasian stability,   
z = epp+epp*–rpp–rpp*<0 is the slope of the compensated excess demand schedule for the 
non-numeraire good in period two, c = epu/eu and c* = epu*/eu* are the marginal 
propensities to consume the non-numeraire good in period two at home and abroad, 
respectively, and m* = –m > 0 is quantity of foreign imports (equal to home exports) of 
the non-numeraire commodity in period two.  
The effect of the period-one transfer on the terms of trade in period two is given by 
equation (12). An additional unit of infrastructure that becomes operational in period 
two generates an increase in income of the recipient country amounting to rg units and 
raises its expenditure on the non-numeraire good by the amount crg. The increase in 
factor productivity also affects the supply of the non-numeraire in the recipient country. 
First, for any allocation of productive factors between the two sectors, the greater 
availability of infrastructure raises productivity and output. This in itself has a positive 
effect on the supply of the non-numeraire in the recipient country. The change in 
productivity may, in addition, cause a reallocation of productive factors between 
sectors. This will occur if the productivity of one sector (or one productive factor) is 
more affected than that of another. For our purposes it is not essential to define the 
precise impact of infrastructure development on the output of each good. It suffices to 
note that rpg, which measures the impact on output of the non-numeraire commodity at 
any given p, may be either positive or negative. If infrastructure development has an 
identical impact on the productivity of all productive factors and sectors of the 
economy, then the supply of the non-numeraire unambiguously increases (i.e., rpg > 0). 
When preferences are homothetic, this increase in supply exceeds the increase in 
demand, so that dp/dT < 0 and the recipient country suffers a terms-of-trade loss in 
period two.
6
 However, if the infrastructure project benefits more the import-competing 
sector, the reallocation of resources in favour of that sector will be at the expense of the 
export sector, dampening its increase in output and possibly resulting in an actual 
decline in the supply of the non-numeraire. Provided that the supply of the non-
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   In this case output of each sector increases in the same proportion as income and expenditure at any 
given p. With homothetic preferences, demand for the non-numeraire also expands in the same 
proportion as income. As the non-numeraire is the export good of the home country, its supply 
exceeds demand and hence the magnitude of the increase in supply is necessarily greater than that of 
the demand. This gives rise to an excess supply of the commodity on the world market and 
deterioration in the terms of trade of the recipient country.     6
numeraire does not increase as much as the demand in the recipient country, its terms of 
trade will improve. 
The effect on period-two welfare of the home country is given by equation (13). An 
additional unit of infrastructure contributes to a change in welfare through two channels: 
The positive direct effect of infrastructure expansion on income, rg, and the terms-of-
trade effect (rpg–crg)m*/s, which may be either positive or negative. If negative, the case 
of Bhagwati=s immiserizing growth occurs when the direct, positive effect of 
infrastructure expansion on income is dominated by a large, negative terms-of-trade 
effect. That is, rg+s
-1(rpg–crg)m*< 0. 
Period-two welfare of the foreign country is affected, as shown in (14), only by the 
terms-of-trade change induced by the expansion of infrastructure in the recipient 
country. Thus in period two, if the terms of trade improve for the donor country, but not 
so much as to cause immiserizing growth in the recipient country, it is possible for both 
the donor and the recipient to enjoy higher period-two welfare.   
We consider next the impact of the transfer on the welfare of the recipient and the donor 
over the two periods combined. By substituting (10) and (13) into (7), and (11) and (14) 
into (8), we obtain the effect of aid on the discounted welfare of the recipient and the 
donor. 
EUdW/dT = S




-1[Z + (1–x)M*C] – s
-1(rpg-crg)m*(1–x)(1+ρ*)
-1 (16) 
where ρ and ρ* are the real rates of interest at home and abroad. That is 1+ρ=(1+δ)eu/EU 
and 1+ρ*=(1+δ*)eu*/EU*. Given the assumption that there is no international lending 
and borrowing, ρ will in general differ from ρ*. We shall assume in what follows that 
the recipient=s real rate of interest is greater than that of the donor. This can be either 
because the rates of time preference differ, with δ > δ*, or because the marginal utility 
of income in the first period relative to that in the second is greater in the recipient 
country than it is in the donor country. A relatively high marginal utility of period-one 
income may result from a severe shortage of resources available for current 
consumption of the recipient, as in the case of a crop failure in an economy that lacks 
internationally marketable assets and is therefore unable to attain a relatively smoother 
time profile of consumption. 
As we have already described all of the components of the change in welfare of both 
countries, there is no need to repeat that analysis here. Simply note that in obtaining the 
change in an economy=s overall welfare, we have discounted the period-two change in 
utility by the country=s real rate of interest. If we add (15) and (16), we find that the 
change in world welfare is given by  
EUdW/dT + EU*dW*/dT = [rg (1+ρ)




where G2* = –s
-1(rpg–crg)m* is the current value of the period-two terms-of-trade gain 
(or loss, if negative) for the donor country. 
Equation (17) shows two potential sources of improvement in world welfare as a result 
of aid being allocated to infrastructure development: First, if the recipient country has a   7
suboptimal stock of infrastructure (i.e., rg > (1+ρ)), which we assume to be the case, any 
aid allocated to building infrastructure will have a positive effect on world welfare. 
World welfare also improves if the period-two change in the terms of trade benefits the 
economy with the lower real rate of interest. That is, if the country that benefits from the 
redistribution of period-two income through a change in the terms of trade is the one 
that attaches a higher valuation to period-two relative to period-one income (i.e., the 
country with the relatively lower real rate of interest). Under our assumptions, this is the 
donor country. 
As equation (17) makes very clear, the possibility of a transfer-induced welfare 
improvement for the world economy emerges in this model due to the existence of two 
distortions. First, the incapacity of the recipient country to attain the optimal stock of 
infrastructure, where rg = (1+ρ), and the incapacity of the recipient country to participate 
in the international capital market and bring ρ into equality with ρ*. If ρ = ρ* and  
rg = 1+ρ, foreign aid only serves to redistribute income from the donor to the recipient in 
the sense that EUdW/dT + EU*dW*/dT = 0. 
4  Dividing foreign aid between consumption and infrastructure 
Let us consider next the implications of reallocating aid between immediate period-one 
consumption and infrastructure development by changing the value of x. How does it 
affect the welfare of the recipient? By differentiating (15) with respect to x, we have  
M(EUdW/dT)/Mx = (Z/S) – (M*C*/S) – [rg /(1+ρ)] + [G2*/(1+ρ)] (18) 
where we recall that G2* = -s
-1(rpg-crg)m* > < 0 is the period-two terms-of-trade gain for 
the donor country. The first term of (18) is positive. It represents the standard period-
one gain enjoyed by the recipient from $1 of additional aid used for immediate 
consumption. The second term, –M*C*/S > 0, corresponds to the income gain due to 
the improvement in the terms-of-trade of the recipient in period one as donor 
households spend more on the recipient=s exports when they reduce their contribution 
for infrastructure development by $1. The third term is the present value of period-two 
output and income loss of the recipient due to lower investment in infrastructure. This 
drop in output and income also affects welfare through a change in the terms of trade in 
period two, given by the fourth term. 
For the donor country, the change in welfare due to an increase in x is given by  
M(EU*dW*/dT)/Mx = (M*C/S) – G2*/(1+ρ*) (19) 
Providing more aid for immediate consumption and less for infrastructure results in a 
period-one terms-of-trade loss for the donor, M*C/S, as the recipient shifts spending 
from infrastructure (i.e., donor=s exportable) to a consumption bundle that also includes 
the donor=s importable good. There is also the loss of G2*, the period-two terms-of-trade 
gain for the donor, when aid for infrastructure is reduced by one unit. If  
(M*C/S) > G2*/(1+ρ*) (20) 
the donor prefers to choose a larger value of x. In the context of the present model, 
where M*C/S < 0, this can occur only if infrastructure development favours sufficiently   8
the recipient=s import-competing sector relative to its export sector, so that G2* < 0 and 
larger than M*C/S in absolute value. 
Recalling that (M*C/S) – 1 = (M*C*/S) – (Z/S) by the definition of S, it follows from 
(18) that the recipient prefers a larger x if  
–(M*C/S) > [rg /(1+ρ)] – 1 – [G2*/(1+ρ)] (21) 
The period-one terms-of-trade improvement from spending $1 of aid on both goods 
rather than on infrastructure must be larger than the efficiency gain from investment in 
infrastructure, [rg  /(1+ρ)] – 1, net of any discounted period-two terms-of-trade loss, 
G2*/(1+ρ). By comparing (20) and (21), it can be readily seen that with ρ > ρ*, both 
countries will never find it in their interest to increase the amount of aid allocated to 
period-one consumption at the expense of infrastructure development for as long as the 
stock of infrastructure of the recipient country is not above the optimal level. That is to 
say, it cannot be the case that (M*C/S) > G2*/(1+ρ*) and (M*C/S) < [G2*/(1+ρ)] + 1 – 
[rg  /(1+ρ)] as long as rg  $ (1+ρ). So while the recipient may wish to have less 
infrastructure development (as when such development results in immiserizing growth) 
or the donor may wish to have less aid allocated to infrastructure development (as when 
it entails a large terms-of-trade loss for the donor in period two), it can never be the case 
that both parties want a higher value of x when the stock of the recipient=s infrastructure 
is below the efficient level. Should the donor want to reallocate aid in favour of 
immediate consumption at the expense of infrastructure development, the recipient will 
wish to move in the opposite direction. 
It is, however, possible for both countries to prefer that more aid be allocated to 
infrastructure at the expense of period-one consumption of the recipient country. The 
donor wants a smaller x when (M*C/S) < G2*/(1+ρ*). This is likely to be satisfied 
under the assumptions of our model as (M*C/S) < 0 and there is strong possibility that 
G2* > 0. As we have seen earlier, G2* > 0, even if infrastructure expansion increases 
productivity uniformly across sectors in the recipient country. 
The recipient prefers more infrastructure over immediate consumption when (M*C/S) + 
[rg /(1+ρ)] – 1 > [G2*/(1+ρ)]. Thus, for both countries to prefer a lower value of x, it 
must be the case that  
(1+ρ)(M*C/S) + rg - (1+ρ) > G2* and  (22) 
G2* > (1+ρ*)(M*C/S) (23) 
When both inequalities are satisfied, then  
rg - (1+ρ) > –(ρ – ρ*)(M*C/S) (24) 
That is, if both countries are in favour of allocating more aid for infrastructure at the 
expense of current consumption of the recipient, the efficiency gain from an additional 
unit of infrastructure must be larger in magnitude than the resulting period-one terms-
of-trade loss for the recipient country multiplied by the international real interest 
differential, ρ – ρ*. The real interest differential reflects the weight of one distortion 
(inability of the recipient to borrow on the world market), while rg – (1+ρ) reflects the 
weight of the second distortion (inability of the recipient to attain the optimal stock of 
infrastructure). When both countries agree to favour infrastructure, then the second   9
distortion must dominate the first in the sense of inequality (24). By contrast, if 
inequality (23) is satisfied, so that the donor prefers to allocate a larger fraction of any 
given aid package for infrastructure, while inequality (22) is not satisfied, then the two 
countries disagree, with the recipient demanding that a larger fraction of aid be 
earmarked for immediate consumption. In practice, this kind of disagreement can 
manifest itself in the recipient=s efforts to divert aid from one project to another and 
counter efforts on the part of the donor to reduce the scope for fungibility of any given 
aid package. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Different forms of aid have different consequences for the donor and the recipient. 
Accordingly, the two countries may either agree or disagree on what is the best way of 
utilizing any given amount of aid. When distortions are present, resources are 
missallocated and there is scope for efficiency improvements. This, however, may or 
may not leave room for finding ways of increasing the welfare of both the donor and the 
recipient by reallocating any given amount of aid among competing uses.  
The focus of the present paper is on intertemporal missallocation of resources due to 
insufficient means of the recipient country to attain the efficient stock of infrastructure 
and its inability to achieve that objective through intertemporal trade. When the poor 
country cannot borrow, reallocation of aid from infrastructure projects to current 
consumption can potentially improve welfare as it serves as a substitute for international 
borrowing. It enables the recipient to enjoy higher consumption in the present at the 
expense of future consumption, both directly and due to an improvement in the period-
one terms of trade. On the other hand, reallocation of aid from current consumption to 
infrastructure development can also contribute to an improvement in welfare by 
bringing the stock of infrastructure closer to the efficient level. What the analysis shows 
in the context of the present model, is that whenever the donor wants to reallocate aid in 
favour of current consumption, the recipient will want to reallocate aid in the opposite 
direction. Alternatively, when the donor wants to reallocate aid in favour of 
infrastructure, the recipient may or may not wish to move in the same direction. We 
were able to show that if both the donor and the recipient benefit from reallocation of 
aid from current consumption to infrastructure, the weight of the distortion associated 
with the suboptimal stock of infrastructure, rg – (1+ρ), exceeds the wight of distorted 
intertemporal trade. The later is measured in the context of the present model by the 
product of the international real interest differential and income gain of the recipient 
from the period-one terms-of-trade improvement in response to the reallocation of aid in 
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